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## WORLD-POLITICS.

LONDON: ST. PETERSBURG: VIENNA: WASHINGTON.

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*March, 1906.*

IN my last communication, I remarked that the advent of fifty-one Labor men into the British Parliament, twenty-nine of whom are pledged to act independently of both Liberals and Conservatives, is a really memorable development, first, because it foreshadows the growth of the Continental group system in English politics—there being now in the House of Commons four distinct parties; secondly, because it is a token that the working-classes are becoming conscious of their political power, are throwing off the domination of caste and social influences, and are determined for the future to be represented in the national legislature by men of their own class who will vote with an exclusive regard to the interests of that class; and, thirdly, because their irruption must profoundly affect the social and political evolution of the country. Under these three heads most, if not all, of the possibilities of the new Labor party are, I believe, fairly comprised. That is to say, Englishmen are asking themselves how far it is likely to influence the workings of the two-party system, and even whether that system is not already at an end. They are also speculating on the direction in which it will affect the future of Liberalism. If the Continent of Europe is any guide on such a point, the answer is not hard to find. Everywhere on the Continent, Liberalism of the old type, the Liberalism that devoted itself to pulling down and levelling, seems to have exhausted its mandate and to have been superseded by a militant and constructive Socialism. It is looking far ahead to assume that such must necessarily be the course of events in England. So long as the House of Lords exists, English Liberalism of the kind one associates with the names of Russell and Gladstone has still its work to do. But I see little reason to

think that, in the work of social reform, of building up, the Liberalism of England is any more likely to succeed than the Liberalism of the Continent; and the possibility that it will put itself at the head of the Labor movement seems to me to have less likelihood than the possibility that it will be chained to its chariot wheels. Again, Englishmen are deeply concerned in trying to forecast the social significance of the Labor party—a subject that deserves an article to itself. They are conscious, or most of them at any rate are conscious, that the failings of their country lie rather in the social than in the political sphere, and that flunkeyism, and all that is implied in it, represents an evil more pervasive and more debilitating than any number of political anomalies or inequalities. If the Labor party helps to eradicate flunkeyism and so infect the English working-classes with something of the American spirit of buoyancy and self-respect, it will have laid the foundations of a real *risorgimento*. And, finally, Englishmen are canvassing the attitude of the Labor men towards the immediate questions and political combinations of the hour, and are wondering how far they will succeed in pushing the Government along the road they desire to see it tread.

There are one or two points connected with the Labor party on which there seem to be misapprehensions among Americans. In the first place, England as a whole is very far from being alarmed by its advent. The country realizes that a change is taking place; it does not admit for one moment that that change amounts to what on the Continent is called “the Revolution”; it is not seriously disturbed—why should it be?—by the fact that the working-classes, who for over twenty years have enjoyed seven-tenths of the voting power of the country, should now be using that power for their own ends; and it relies as confidently as ever upon the sound sense and conservatism of the nation to restrain any little extravagancies that the new movement, in its first moments of exaltation, may be guilty of. The old and tried institutions of the land never seemed to rest on a surer basis, and there is more than a little force in the contention that the rise of a Labor party is less an attack upon the existing system than a token that the existing system is preparing to adapt itself to new conditions. No one in England imagines that, because fifty-one working-men have been elected to the House of Commons, the deluge has begun. It is recognized that many

special circumstances, such as are not likely to be found in conjunction again, combined to secure their election. One was the Taff Vale judgment (on which I shall have a word to say later on), and the injudicious and somewhat contemptuous refusal of the late Government to reverse it. That refusal practically flung down the gage to every trade-unionist in the country, and no diagnosis of the Labor successes can be held complete which does not recognize that they were won, not by Socialism, but by trade-unionism. Again, the Chinese labor question, the fiscal issue, and the alarming decline in the manners and efficiency of the House of Commons, told heavily in favor of a party that was not only new, but could claim a peculiar right of appeal to working-class sentiment. So favoring a combination of circumstances will scarcely occur again. Moreover, it is a law of politics that changes are rarely followed by greater changes, but rather by a reaction towards the old order. The Labor party will be just as much subject to the swing of the pendulum as any other party. It has also to be remembered that the Labor candidates were elected by the votes of organized labor, and that behind the ranks of organized labor stand the far larger ranks of unorganized labor, whose members are in no way disposed to take their orders either from trade-unionism or from Socialism, and who, indeed, are widely removed from both. Bearing all this in mind, England while deeply interested in, is by no means terrified by, the Labor party. The expectation is that it will increase, but not at a rate that need cause a rational man any alarm, and not along lines that will threaten any of the foundations of the State. I need scarcely say that the Labor men themselves take a far more optimistic view of their future than this, and fully expect in the course of the next ten or fifteen years to be the controlling power in the land. What I have said must be taken as representing average detached opinion.

There is another misconception as to the Labor party and the men who compose it that seems to prevail very largely in America. They are spoken of as though they belonged to the agitating kind of demagogues. On the contrary, they are men of an extremely practical, businesslike and unrhetoical turn. It would probably be impossible to pick out fifty-one members of the House of Commons whose combined experience in administrative work, and whose knowledge of the realities of the people's life,

would equal those of the fifty-one Labor members. With the exception of three or four, all of them have earned their living by manual work for weekly wages. They have risen in the confidence of their fellow workers, not through any gift of eloquence, but by reason of their native shrewdness and capacity for organization, and because their judgment, honesty and turn for affairs have been thoroughly tested in the management of trade-unions and benevolent societies. A great many of them have already served for years on the local councils of their neighborhood. All of them go to the legislature for the unique purpose of legislating. All of them "mean business," and enter upon their new duties in a spirit of grim, hard-headed earnestness. Into the somewhat languid and over-elegant atmosphere of English politics they will import a wholesome example of laborious efficiency. Politics to them is not a sport, nor a spring-board from which to leap into social or professional fame. It is a business. They are the salaried representatives of a class—a class accustomed to "getting its money's worth," and anything but tolerant towards those who fail to obtain results. No doubt, the Labor men will use language and introduce a standard of behavior of which the House of Commons has hitherto had little experience. But to represent them as noisy agitators is to misapprehend them entirely.

I have spoken so far of the Labor party as one. In reality, it is composed of three groups who may not on all questions be found in harmony. The most important of these groups is the section controlled by the Labor Representation Committee. The L. R. C. includes trade-unions, trades-councils, Socialist societies and cooperative associations. It has only been in existence some six years, but its membership already amounts to nearly a million. Its object is "to secure, by united action, the election to Parliament of candidates promoted, in the first instance, by an affiliated society or societies in the constituency, who undertake to form or join a distinct group in Parliament, with its own whips and its own policy on labor questions, to abstain strictly from identifying themselves with, or promoting the interests of, any section of the Liberal or Conservative party, and not to oppose any other candidate recognized by this Committee." All candidates who subscribe to these pledges are paid twenty-five per cent. of their election expenses and two hundred pounds a year during the term

of their service in Parliament. Of the fifty-one Labor members in the House, twenty-nine were elected under the auspices of the Labor Representation Committee, and form accordingly a separate group under the leadership of Mr. Keir Hardie. Of the remaining twenty-two Labor members, sixteen are miners' representatives, who stand apart from Mr. Keir Hardie and his friends, are somewhat coldly regarded by the Socialists who compose the inner and guiding section of the Labor Representation Committee, and look upon themselves rather as the advance wing of the Liberal party than as an independent Labor section. In addition, there are a few members who, while Labor men in fact and in sympathies, answer to no more precise definition, being for the most part the representatives of special trades and occupations, such as cotton, railroads, printing and so on. It is, however, worth noting that of the total of fifty-one members, all but ten are trade-unionists; and it is on that fact that observers base the prediction that ultimately all the Labor members will be united into a compact and distinct party under a single leadership. If such unity is achieved, it can only be on a foundation of compromise. Trade-unionists in England, speaking generally, are not Socialists, and the miners' representatives in particular have little or no sympathy with what Mr. Keir Hardie has described as the supreme object of his policy—the creation, namely, of a cooperative commonwealth founded upon the socialization of land and capital, and the “nationalization of all the means of production, distribution and exchange.” Labor, therefore, in England is at present more of a generic term than a specific party label. It covers many real divergences of policy and instinctive outlook. Their reality may be best appreciated by the fact that Mr. Keir Hardie recently wrote two long articles on the Labor movement in some English reviews without once mentioning the name of Mr. John Burns.

There are, however, certain measures on which it is likely that all sections of the Labor party will be at one. The payment of members, I may add, is not one of them, in spite of the fact that it was endorsed on March 7th by an overwhelming majority in the House of Commons. The reason is obvious. The trade-unions and the Labor Representation Committee have found that they can support their own representatives in the House by imposing upon all their members the ridiculously small tax of

two cents a head. The State payment of Members of Parliament, therefore, so far from benefiting them would be of positive dis-service by opening the doors of Parliament to a facile crowd of lawyers, journalists and carpetbaggers. The chief matter that concerns the Labor party is the legal position of trade-unions. The *Taff Vale* case decided that, if a trade-union broke the law, it could be restrained by injunction and mulcted in damages. Thus the payments which trade-unionists have made to "benefit" funds can be debited with the damages which a court of law may inflict for acts committed in a strike by trade-union officials in contravention of the law. To regulate what they hold to be this grave injustice and to save their benefit funds are the first objects of the Labor group. Again, the law is in a state of chaos on the subject of "picketing." John Jones may advise people not to work for the Great Western Railway. If the officials of the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants do the same thing, they break the law. One person cannot "conspire." A number of persons can. Recent decisions have declared that trade-unions, as corporations, are not only legally capable of doing wrong, but far more capable than private individuals. Moreover, the definition of what constitutes "picketing" has recently grown harsher and more exacting. These are both grievances that the trade-unions are determined to redress. Again, they are interested in extending the scope of the Workmen's Compensation Act and in securing State contributions to workmen's insurance funds. Most of them, too, are anxious to have the principle recognized that it is the duty of the State to find and provide work for the unemployed. Practically all of them favor a purely secular system of education, and are agreed in desiring the enforcement of trade-union wages in public contracts, in improving the conditions of Government employment and in advocating the compulsory sale of land and its division into small allotments. The present Government, however, is not a Radical, still less is it a Socialist, Government. Its leaders are the representatives of the conservative middle classes, where they are not the representatives of the aristocracy. They are friendly to the Labor party, but will not hesitate to withstand its extreme demands; and, if we in England are really on the eve of the long-expected conflict between Labor and Capital, the first token of it may be looked for in a quarrel between Labor and Liberalism.

ST. PETERSBURG, *March, 1906.*

CONTRARY to common belief, the Autocracy has but reeled, not fallen. Since last February, thanks to the robust loyalty of the army, it has temporarily recovered its equilibrium, and now threatens, not only to minimize the promises which it made to the nation last October, but even to take back some of the concessions granted. True, as yet no irrevocable step backwards has been taken, no fatal word has been spoken by Nicholas II. On the contrary, in the only speech which he deliberately uttered to the deputations that went to Tsarskoye Selo to beseech him to resume absolute power, he showed a praiseworthy resolve to keep his promise and govern the Empire constitutionally. "*Quod scripsi scripsi*" he virtually said; and, displaying the courage of Pilate, he refused to recede from the position once taken up. But now, swayed by influences which are many and intimate, he is said to be washing his hands of Liberalism in every shape and form. At first it was urged that the title "Autocrat," meaning only an independent monarch, might and should be retained, could not indeed be dropped without offending the monarch who had borne it. Then it was pointed out that, as the Tsar had nowhere expressly said that he restricted his powers, they were as absolute now as ever; and, lastly, it was argued that there is one thing which even a Russian Tsar cannot do—he cannot renounce absolutism. And now the political pendulum is swinging towards despotism again.

The symptoms of this change—as yet one sees only symptoms—are numerous and very significant: needless arrests, uncalled-for restrictions, the employment of repression as a preventive of evil that might never have come, and, last but not least, the attitude of the Tsar himself. That the Government should put down the armed rising by ungentle measures was natural, for it was engaged in a struggle to the death, and the troops were embittered by acts of treachery and revolting cruelty. But when the fight was almost over, and the insurgents worsted, it was a foolish policy and an unfavorable symptom to allow men to be executed after a very flimsy inquiry and a very hurried trial. Strength is patient. Again, in districts quite distant from the civil war, many innocent individuals were seized and put in prison on mere suspicion, and set free a week or fortnight later without apology or explanation. It is understood that Count Witté, who



is the official head of the Government, was strongly and violently opposed to all these ill-advised measures, but that, on appealing to the Emperor, he was assured by the monarch that repression was peremptorily necessary, that it was carefully restricted to those who had done something to merit it, and was fairly adjusted to the varying degrees of guilt. That was the view adopted by the Tsar. Behind the Tsar stood M. Durnovo. Now, Durnovo, the acting Home Secretary, is an official whose name connotes a whole political programme, and whose acts appear to be inspired by a taste for systematic coercion as a *régime*. He is a noteworthy man. Dismissed from office by Alexander III, who used very strong and damaging language respecting him, he was demurred to by Nicholas II when Count Witté submitted his name as a candidate for office in a "business cabinet." "That man Durnovo!" the Emperor exclaimed when the Premier mentioned him. "No, no! My father cashiered him for certain backslidings, and I have no confidence in him." "Well, but we have nobody else, Your Majesty, who knows the machinery of home Government so well as he, and that is unhappily the most important branch of the administration at present. Besides, we want him only for a short time, and it is not necessary that he be made minister. The title of 'acting-minister' will be quite enough." "Very well, be it as you say," was the reply, and Durnovo's star thereupon began to rise.

All that happened less than six months ago. To-day, Durnovo is the Tsar's man. His will, entwined in that of the Tsar, is law. He is the real ruler of Russia. He it is who presses the button which kills suspected people, which burns huts and hovels, imprisons the innocent together with the guilty, and is fanning the embers of civil war. But the most grotesque aspect of the matter is that, whereas Durnovo breaks, it is Witté who pays with his name and reputation. He is the nominal head of the Government, but in truth he is the scapegoat of the Autocracy. All the credit he had gained by the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, by the introduction of the gold standard into Russia, by the creation of a native industry, by the repeal of religious persecutions, and by the manifesto of October, is being sacrificed at the shrine of the Autocracy; and for a whole generation Witté will remain under a cloud. His bitterest enemy is the very official who, without his intercession, would never have been admitted to high office.

If the most cruel action of Durnovo was the sanguinary repression of the insurrectionary movement after it had ceased to be dangerous, the most harmful, perhaps one might add fatal, effect of his baleful influence was the friendly attitude of the Tsar towards a deputation which was sent by a reactionary political party. The fundamental principle of that party is that, without the Autocracy, without a monarch having unbounded power, Russia is doomed to destruction, and that there is one step which even an autocrat has no right to take: the limitation of his own powers. That party was received and welcomed by Nicholas II, although its avowed aim and object is to thwart the scheme put forward by Nicholas himself in his October manifesto. Now, a monarch, one would think, ought to be the head of all legal parties and the protector of none. It seems particularly odd that the Tsar should single out for special distinction and favor the one association which condemns the liberty he granted to his people, and strives to hinder its embodiment in institutions. His people regard it as symptomatic. But a sensational touch was given to the incident when the members of the delegation, emboldened by His Majesty's friendly advances, actually presented to him and to the baby Tsarevitch the badges of their reactionary party! How can the Russian people any longer put faith in the Emperor's intentions to fulfil the solemn promises made last October for himself and his son, if he has accepted the badge of a party which condemns all concessions to the nation as disastrous?

And now, therefore, the whole question, which for a time seemed settled, has cropped up again: Will the Court treat the stipulations of the October manifesto as it treated the engagements taken towards Finland, and, ignoring them, endeavor to introduce the *status quo ante*? Is the hope, which many still entertain, that Russia will now enter the ranks of adult nations, and develop a constitution answering to her own needs, chimerical? Many thinking people here in the country itself maintain that all such hopes are vain, and for that reason they openly or secretly favor a return to revolutionary methods. They are even ready to attack the State, to undermine its finances, and thwart its foreign policy, for the sake of obtaining the measure of reform which they deem indispensable. They would burn down the house in order to roast the pig. And that section of the population is one element of the present situation.

The clergy is another factor; but, unhappily, one cannot say much for the political attitude or the intellectual resources of the Church Militant in Russia. There is, doubtless, a leaven of good and holy men among them, but it is too insignificant, too powerless, to raise the general level of the order. And when the blind lead the blind, a like dismal fate overtakes the leaders and the led. Unfortunately, some of the liberally disposed ecclesiastics whose politics are modern, and whose intelligence is developed, are ruled out of court by their ethical idiosyncrasies. In their case the spirit may be willing, but the flesh is very weak. The Muscovite prelates, on the other hand, men of decided dogmatic views, fanatical resolve and theologico-political intolerance, will listen to no talk of a change in the framework of the State.

Curiously characteristic of clergy and people—of the people who quench their religious thirst at the almost exhausted source of Russian theology—is a horrible drama which one of the journals of St. Petersburg narrates in gruesome detail. A priest lives in Cronstadt, named Father John, whom thousands of Russians regard or, until last October, regarded as a saint able to read men's thoughts, pierce the veil of futurity and work miracles at will. Other thousands, on the contrary, look down upon him as a charlatan, a mischief-maker, a false prophet. His most ardent followers—one of whom proclaimed herself the Virgin-Mother of God—are sectarians of the most fanatical sort. In the village of Upper Yelshanka, the Joannites, as they are termed, hold that Father John is an incarnation of the God of Sabaoth, and in order to worship him fittingly they recently sacrificed a woman in his honor, a woman aged forty-one, the mother of a family of five! That, they affirmed, was a sacrifice worthy of the Almighty, and all the more acceptable because the victim herself was willing and even eager to die for her faith. So well pleased were these misguided people with their ghastly act of worship, that they were making ready to sacrifice two other women, when the police, informed by the common-sense villagers, interfered and hindered the slaughter. Such are among the most intelligent of the masses for whom universal suffrage is clamorously claimed by the radical few.

Of all the Liberal factions in the country, the best organized and most popular, because most democratic, is the so-called Constitutional Democratic Party, composed of representatives of

the Zemstvos, of journalists, lawyers and members of non-Russian nationalities who expect political salvation from universal suffrage, and demand a number of other reforms for which most European peoples are still patiently waiting. This numerous body held a congress recently to determine its attitude toward the Duma. The result is very interesting and quite characteristic. The first question put was: "Shall we take part in the elections?" To which the almost unanimous answer was, "Yes." "Shall we enter the Duma?" was the second query proposed, and the reply was also in the affirmative, only two voices dissenting. Then came the crucial issue: "Are we to work in the Duma as in a normal institution?" To which every vote recorded gave a negative answer. The Duma, therefore, will not be regarded as a normal body in the State, to be treated as an embryonic parliament, the custodian of the people's rights, the champion of its claims, but simply as an assembly which is here to-day and gone to-morrow. It is a mere stop-gap. That attitude may prove fatal to the Duma itself, and destructive of all reasonable hopes based upon its labors. In other words, the Liberals, who threw away a magnificent opportunity of establishing constitutional government last October, are now about to fritter away another chance, which may not soon return.

To the left of the Constitutional Democratic Party stand the Social Democrats and Social Revolutionists, whose faith is in firearms, rifles, field-guns and dynamite bombs, and whose organization is admirably compact. These men, or many of them, are quite ready to die for their convictions at a moment's notice; but, in order to increase their number by those colleagues who prefer to live, they demand the abolition of capital punishment throughout the Empire. Being single-minded, sharp-sighted and firmly resolved, they wield a degree of influence out of all proportion to their number. It was those men who organized the railway, postal and telegraph strikes, and for a time appeared to be within an ace of success.

The insurrection having fizzled out, the parties of violence resolved to inaugurate a reign of terror. "We will take a leaf," they said, "from the book of our Polish friends who are wiping out all the prominent fighters on the side of the Autocracy, and we will spare none, not even police officers of low rank, whom mediocrity has hitherto saved." They kept their word, as usual.

Murder followed murder with rapidity, and the ease with which the assassins made good their escape intensified the dismay of the Government. In the course of one week, the Governor-General of Moscow, the acting Minister of the Interior and Count Witté himself were requested by the police not to leave their dwellings. But it is hardly to be believed that the party which, by killing Alexander II, put off the dawn of Russian liberty for more than a quarter of a century, will repeat the blunder it then committed.

A strange document, closely typewritten on three foolscap pages and purporting to have been issued by the "Pan-Russian League of Fighters for Freedom," was recently forwarded to me, together with a written request to make the contents known in America and Europe. It is a very forcible statement of the case against the Russian Autocracy, its champions and friends, the clergy, the nobles, the landowners, capitalists and the *bourgeois* generally, and an answer to the question, "What is to be done?" Here are the words of the answer:

"With force alone can we cope with their force. They have declared war on the nation, and it behooves us therefore to look upon them much as we should regard foreign foes; it is our duty to wage a merciless and a bloody war against them. But how can that war be carried on prudently and to the best purpose? In war, all means are good in order to conquer and annihilate the enemy. First and foremost, however, it is important to husband our force, and not to expend it in vain. . . . It is necessary to awaken the consciousness and the conscience of the peasantry and of the other respectable sections of the community. Every kind of agrarian league should be founded, workingmen's Committees and Councils summoned to discuss affairs. People of the same way of thinking should be brought together, and provided with arms; fighting companies ought to be organized, and measures adopted to paralyze the activity of landowners, factory proprietors, merchants and the State Treasury. Among these measures is the cessation of labor, the organization of strikes, the refusal at all costs to pay rates or taxes.

"Wherever possible, the Government should be deprived of its ill-gotten money, and for this purpose local treasuries, banks, alcohol-shops, and other places in which State funds are deposited, should be rifled: the land must be wrested from the squires, whose country-seats must be burned to cinders, while they themselves should be driven from their accursed nests."

The revolutionary programme, if indeed it be genuine and not forged by some member of the police, then goes on to describe the *modus operandi*. The chosen victims are the commanders of

the army and the police. There is a whole army of heroic men, the programme continues, ready to forfeit their lives in the cause of the nation, but unable to cope with the Imperial armies in the field.

"For this reason at the present moment the most practical, the most profitable, means of combat is the creation of independent little fighting groups and secret societies, and also the action of individual champions concentrating all their efforts on the destruction of every rank and condition of members, servants and agents of the Government, beginning at the very highest rung of the ladder and ending with the lowest, once it is shown that they have cooperated with the Government in its war with the people. As enemies of the nation we have to consider all those who, to any extent, actively oppose the movement in favor of freedom. They must all be treated as enemies are treated in war-time: wheresoever found they should be destroyed, together with their property and their kindred.

"From this point of view, it is helpful to kill not only ministers, courtiers of all ranks, Generals, Governors, commanders of troops, gendarmes, police-detectives and spies . . . but also priests who speak or act against popular liberties, landowners who appeal to the authorities for protection against the people, heads of industrial firms who shut up their factories or call in the soldiers and the police."

If this be the revolutionists' way of promoting the cause of freedom and enlightenment in Russia, the ill-starred people of that country may well exclaim: "Save me from my friends!"

All reasonable Russia would consequently be arrayed against them, were it not for the mischievous effect produced by the reactionaries who hanker after the old despotism, which would leave to them the exercise of absolute power and to the Tsar the responsibility for its abuse.

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VIENNA, *March*, 1906.

At this delicate juncture of European affairs, Austria-Hungary is again, and with good reason, attracting universal attention. People wonder what will be the upshot of the violent recrudescence of domestic difficulties with which this indispensable element of international tranquillity finds itself confronted. Those who clearly realize the vital importance of the part played by this great and ancient monarchy in the equilibrium of the Powers, and in the peace and prosperity of Europe, ask themselves anxiously whether it will once more weather the storm that lowers so menacingly upon its political horizon.

Fortunately, dark as the outlook unquestionably is, an impartial survey of the situation tends to show that it is, on the whole, less desperate than people have been disposed to imagine. One decidedly reassuring feature is that Europe is more than ever alive to the fact that the integrity of the Hapsburg dominions is essential to its own self-preservation and its protection from an intolerable Prussian hegemony. This cardinal fact has latterly been strongly impressed upon it by the restlessness and mischief-making of the Kaiser and his Government, which have excited the apprehensions of almost all the neighboring states.

If Austria-Hungary be saved from foreign interference, German as well as Russian, her peoples are quite capable of working out their own salvation. Indeed, so far as the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy is concerned, they have made a great step in advance in the introduction by the Government, on February 23rd, of the Bill substituting universal suffrage for the former system of class representation, which was a gratuitous additional source of dissension in a country made up of so many nationalities and languages. The good sense of the German element in Austria has enabled it to eliminate the worst of the poison of the imported Pan-Germanic agitation that did so much mischief a few years ago,—a result to which Germany's "dumping" methods in her ally's territory have largely contributed, as have also her not unsuccessful efforts to oust Austrian industry from its own special preserves, the Balkan States. The Hungarians, on the other hand, have quite recovered from their old deference to the political wisdom of Berlin, bitter experience having proved that their confidence in the lavish flatteries of William II, and in the professions of his Government, did not save them from Pan-Germanic agitation among their own fellow subjects of German nationality in Transylvania, nor from the sacrifice of their economic interests in the hard bargain forced upon them in defiance of their Parliamentary majority—the commercial treaty with the German Empire. Everything considered, it is evident that the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy has fairly entered upon the path of progress, and that its present troubles, serious though they may appear, are but the growing-pains and juvenile ailments of a young and vigorous representative system.

One of the unavowed causes of the popularity somewhat suddenly acquired by the Opposition parties in Hungary, which have

now become the Coalition majority, cannot be publicly discussed in this country. It was the desire of the Magyar element, who are devoted to their Liberal institutions, to take precautions in advance against the reactionary tendencies of the heir-apparent, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and they feared that the Government party, which had been in power so long, had become too subject to Court influence to insist upon the modifications of the existing system which they considered indispensable. The Hungarians know the school in which their future sovereign was taught, and the manner in which his father, the late Archduke Karl Ludwig, was accustomed to speak of his specific for overcoming the resistance of a Parliamentary majority to the royal will—namely, the vigorous employment of loyal Austrian troops. It was this knowledge that made them desire more effective control over their own part of the common army.

The cavalier fashion in which the Emperor-King treated the leaders of the Hungarian Coalition majority, whom he summoned to Vienna merely to receive his ultimatum, in the form of a refusal to consider their claim that the employment of the German language should be abandoned in the Hungarian regiments of the army, is believed to have been prompted by his meddling ally the German Emperor. It is suspected that the resumption of absolutist methods has been encouraged from the same quarter, though prompted nearer home. The experience and prudence of the old Sovereign, who is in his seventy-sixth year, justifies the hope, however, that he will scarcely allow himself to be tempted too far into an open conflict with the Hungarian people, thus running the risk of being again obliged to resort to that brutal military repression to which he found himself committed on ascending the throne in 1848 as a boy of eighteen. Besides, he has frequently shown that he is docile to experience and capable of abandoning a policy when it proves unworkable. He will need fresh resources for the new artillery, and he cannot well afford to forego the cooperation of the Hungarian Parliament in raising them. Nor can he be blind to the significance of the warning recently given by the Austrian Chamber of Peers as to the necessity of a constitutional *régime* in Hungary for the effective working of the "Delegations," which may be described as a joint committee of the Austrian and Hungarian Legislatures.

The present Hungarian Ministry, drawn from the Parliament-



ary minority, has proposed, with the previous sanction of the Crown, to grant universal suffrage. This is evidently with the object of mobilizing the masses, and particularly the non-Magyar element, against the Coalition majority which refused to take office unless their programme were accepted by the Sovereign. The prospect thus opened up to the unenfranchised population will profoundly modify the conditions of the struggle at the General Elections, which, according to the Constitution, must be held in May. But the Coalition leaders and their organs in the press have already begun to pay court, not only to the masses, who have long been prepared by an active Socialist propaganda, but to the non-Magyar element. It is not impossible that they may succeed in outbidding their opponents, who are handicapped by the circumstance that they are working in concert with the Austrian advisers of the Crown, and against the national sentiment of their own race. The result of these elections will inevitably have a great effect upon the Emperor-King, as well as upon the new Parliament. By showing both exactly how they stand towards the country, they will clear the ground for a compromise that might have been secured before now if Berlin had been wise enough to avoid interfering in a family difference. Indeed, a compromise might possibly have been concluded ere this, had the Emperor-King consented to part with his Foreign Minister, Count Goluchowski, who is the *bête noire* of the Hungarian majority and has indeed few friends in Austria.

Although the coming elections in Hungary will, doubtless, strengthen the hands of the majority, whose policy thus far has been somewhat unfortunate owing to the lack of harmony between its leaders, the latter are sure to think twice before letting their difference with the Sovereign drift to extremes, thus running the risk of having to fight out the quarrel with the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, an obstinate and headstrong Prince who is understood to have very different views on government from those of his future Hungarian subjects.

Great as are the difficulties to be overcome, there is reason to anticipate that, (1) as a consequence of the scheme of Universal Suffrage now before the Austrian Reichsrath, a working compromise between the nationalities of this half of the Dual Monarchy will eventually be secured under the conciliatory influence of a genuinely representative system; and (2) that the inevitable re-

vision—predicted in my presence in 1898 by that far-seeing Magyar statesman, the late Desider Szilagyi—of the terms of the existing *Ausgleich*, or terminable compact regulating the economic and monetary relations between the Austrian and Hungarian halves of the Dual Monarchy, will be made. This *Ausgleich* constituting the two countries into a common customs territory, after the manner of the states of the German Empire, expires next year, and must be renewed on terms acceptable to both, while leaving each more liberty than it has had in economic affairs. If this double task be fulfilled (and both peoples recognize it as essential, not only to their welfare, but to their very existence), it is practically certain that their common interests and the outside pressure to which they are subjected will once more exercise their full unifying influence upon this extraordinary mosaic of nationalities. The Dual Monarchy will then be in a better position than ever before to fulfil its beneficent mission of protecting and promoting the development of the Balkan States, and of acting as a bulwark against the Pan-Germanic ambition which aims at the disintegration of the Hapsburg dominions, the extension of the German Confederation to the Adriatic, and a hegemony over the rest of Southeastern Europe and Asiatic Turkey.

Up to that comparatively recent period when, first, Czech, and then German, obstruction in the Austrian Reichsrath attracted foreign attention to its proceedings, the Parliamentary character of that assembly was more nominal than real. The Sovereign still ruled under a Parliamentary mask, with the aid of the proverbial “thirty aristocrats who govern Austria.” The present system, with its excessive representation of the landed interest and latterly of the large manufacturers, which rendered this condition of affairs possible, has long since broken down, and it will now be certainly replaced at an early date by that of “universal, equal and direct suffrage.” This will at the same time take the power out of the hands of the German element, and of the landowners and propertied classes generally.

What effect will this radical change have upon the relations of the Dual Monarchy with foreign countries, and more particularly with Germany and the Balkan States? This is an interesting and most important inquiry, which is suggested with particular force by recent events, such as the altered attitude towards Germany of the Hungarian majority (hitherto stalwart supporters

of the Triple Alliance) and the disapproval of that same Hungarian majority, as well as of a section of the Austrian people, of the overbearing action of the Vienna Foreign Office towards Servia in the matter of the projected Customs Convention with Bulgaria. The present hostility of the Hungarians to Germany, and their obvious desire for a reconciliation with the Servians, the most important of the Slav races with which they have immediate dealings, are but the confirmation of a change that has been proceeding gradually and surely for some years past, the completion of which will in all probability deprive what Prince von Bülow has aptly and correctly styled "Prussia-Germany" of the support of Austria-Hungary in realizing her ambitions. Germany has abused her position to the detriment of her Austro-Hungarian ally—economically in the Balkans and in the commercial treaties concluded between the two Powers, and both politically and economically at Constantinople. The natural result is that she has well-nigh exhausted the patience of the two elements upon which the Alliance was based in this country, namely the Germans in Austria and the Magyars in Hungary.

The sympathy shown in both halves of the Monarchy for the Servians, in their recent conflict with the Vienna Foreign Office, is also a noteworthy sign of a spirit which promises in time to lead to a new policy towards the Balkan States. Hitherto, there were two currents of Austro-Hungarian public opinion on this matter—first, the desire of the Austrian manufacturer to guard those States as his exclusive preserve, and, secondly, the half-avowed Government policy of maintaining dissensions between them as a means of preventing their consolidation, with its corollary of a settlement of the Macedonian question in their favor. The future Austrian and Hungarian Parliaments, however, are not likely to share this desire for territorial expansion, with its concomitant increase of military expenditure. The public in this country were never enthusiastic about the acquisition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It has only served as a somewhat poor consolation to their defeated dynasty, and, if it were not regarded as a stage on the way to Salonica in some indefinite future, they would often wonder what they were doing there.

But when King Victor Emmanuel, son-in-law of the Prince of Montenegro, ascended the Italian throne, this dream of expansion began to fade, and would seem doomed to vanish altogether.

Italy, which cannot abandon the Montenegrins and the results of her own work in Albania, will not permit Austria to take a footing at Salonica. Nor can Austria consent to see Italy establish herself on the Albanian coast, either at Avlona or Durazzo, thus converting the Adriatic into an Italian lake. Consequently, both Powers would appear to be checkmated, so far as territorial expansion is concerned. In these circumstances, Austria may be expected eventually to abandon her constant aim to maintain disunion among the Balkan States, and to prevent their material as well as political consolidation, as she has done, for instance, in the case of Servia, whose efforts to secure access to the Adriatic by a railway from Nisch to Skutari she has thwarted at Constantinople for ten years past. It is also to be hoped that she will abandon her systematic opposition to that one hope of a satisfactory settlement of the Macedonian question: the creation of a Balkan Confederation strong enough to justify Europe in attempting a fair partition of Macedonia between the adjoining Balkan States. There can be no doubt that the indignation of the Austrian Foreign Office against the projected Customs Convention between Servia and Bulgaria (which has now been emasculated under threat of a tariff war) was rather political than economic. Servia, practically cut off from other markets, secured from Bulgaria under that Convention the right to send her goods through the Principality to the Black Sea free of duty, but Austria would not consent to this either on commercial or political grounds, and protested that the two States had no right to conclude such a treaty. It should be remembered that Austria-Hungary made a similar protest against Servia's first Commercial Treaty, that concluded with England in 1880. Taking advantage of the privileged position given to her by the Treaty of Berlin, she ousted British trade from Servia in a fashion somewhat similar to that in which Germany is ousting her own at the present moment. But this sort of treatment cannot last forever! When diplomatic relations between England and Servia are again resumed—which will, doubtless, be very soon—it is to be expected that Great Britain, France and other disinterested European Powers that have long advised the Balkan States to come to an understanding between themselves, will help to counteract the pernicious policy of the "closed door," pursued at Constantinople by Austria and Germany. This policy is putting spokes

in the wheel of progress, and, with a short-sighted and unintelligent selfishness, retarding the development of the Balkans and hampering the commerce of all the maritime States with an extensive region rich in natural resources.

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WASHINGTON, *March, 1906.*

ALTHOUGH nearly four months have elapsed since the first session of the Fifty-ninth Congress began, and, although three of the measures earnestly and avowedly desired by the President—to wit, the Philippine Tariff bill, the Statehood bill and the Railway Rate-Making bill—were quickly carried through the House of Representatives, not one of them has secured the approval of the Senate, and two of them are buried beyond the hope of resurrection. Only selfish motives could have prompted the stifling of the Philippine Tariff bill in the committee of the Senate to which it had been referred. As we have formerly pointed out, the only objection to this measure is that it did not go far enough. We are obviously bound in equity to treat the Philippines as well as we treat Porto Rico and Hawaii. Porto Rico enjoys absolute free trade with the United States, although her sugar and tobacco compete with our domestic products. In view of this concession to Porto Rico, the Philippine Tariff bill should have been compressed in a line that simply announced that, on and after a certain date, all products of the Philippines would be admitted to the ports of the United States, duty free. As a matter of fact, the bill provided that, while all other products of the Philippines should be exempt from duty in our ports, sugar and tobacco should pay 25 per cent. of the Dingley rates up to 1909, after which they also should be free from duty. Inadequate as it was, this proposal met with strenuous resistance on the part of the “Stand-Patters” in the House of Representatives, but in that chamber Speaker Cannon, with the assistance of Democratic members, succeeded in inflicting an overwhelming defeat upon the rebels, and in securing the performance of an act of justice. The bill then went to the Senate, where it was referred to a committee, of which a majority were “Stand-Patters” and in which consequently it was killed.

Speaker Cannon also managed to drive through the House of Representatives under whip and spur the Statehood bill for the admission into the Union of Oklahoma Territory and Indian

Territory as a single State, and also for the admission of the Territories of Arizona and New Mexico as one State. The fusion of Arizona and New Mexico was hotly and persistently opposed in the House on the ground that the inhabitants of the first-named Territory were vehemently opposed to such amalgamation. The protestants, however, as we have said, were not strong enough to beat the measure in the House, but the Senate, after a prolonged debate, adopted by a majority of thirteen an amendment proposed by Senator Foraker, providing that the question whether the fusion of the two Territories should take place should be submitted to the inhabitants of Arizona and New Mexico separately, and, if a majority in either Territory should reply in the negative, the fusion should not be effected. Not satisfied, apparently, with this precaution, the Senate proceeded to adopt, by a majority of two, another amendment, excising all mention of Arizona or New Mexico from the bill. In that mutilated form, the bill was passed, and was sent to a conference committee. As we go to press, it seems probable that Speaker Cannon will insist upon instructing the House members of the conference committee to demand the enactment of the bill in its original shape; but it is expected that he will ultimately advise the House to pass the bill in its dismembered form.

As for the treaty with Santo Domingo, it has not been definitely killed, but is sleeping in the Committee on Foreign Relations. It will not be awakened and reported to the Senate until Mr. Lodge sees a better prospect of securing the votes needed for ratification than is now offered. There are in the Senate only 56 Republicans, there being a vacancy in Delaware and one Republican Senator, Burton of Kansas, being unavoidably absent. Consequently, four Democratic votes are required to constitute the prescribed two-thirds, but, since the Democratic Senators decided in caucus to oppose the measure, only two are procurable. For the present, the Santo Domingo treaty will remain in its present curious condition. We say "curious," because, while the treaty is inchoate in the United States, it is operative in Santo Domingo, where American agents designated by our Government, but appointed by the Dominican Executive, are actually discharging the collection and distribution of customs revenue in pursuance of the treaty's provisions. Whether Mr. Roosevelt has any right to act under a treaty which, as lacking ratification

by our Senate, is for the United States no treaty at all, is a question about which constitutional lawyers differ. We ourselves should answer the question in the negative.

The Hepburn bill, which, when it left the House of Representatives, embodied the President's views and wishes regarding Government rate-making for railroads, has now become the Hepburn-Tillman bill, having been reported, unamended, by a Democratic member of the committee to which it was referred. It has undergone, in other words, the same kind of metamorphosis which the Bland bill experienced. The latter measure, it will be remembered, having left the House of Representatives under the name of its Democratic author, was reported to the Senate from the Senatorial Committee by a Republican Senator, Mr. Allison, and thus found itself transformed into the Bland-Allison bill. In the present instance, the odd result of a game of cross-purposes, and of a clash between the friends of the railroads and the friends of the President, was that those Senators who thought that the Hepburn bill went too far voted to place the reporting of it to the Senate in the hands of a Democrat who thought it did not go far enough. If the Republican friends of the Administration and the Democrats should cooperate, they could undoubtedly pass the Hepburn-Tillman bill in the form which it wore when it left the House of Representatives. If they do not come to such an agreement, the chances are that the Republicans of all shades of opinion will come to some understanding as to the crucial point, namely, the extent to which an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission may be reviewed by the Courts. What the friends of the railroads want is that the power of judicial review shall be complete, and shall include the right to suspend by injunction the operation of an order, pending the final adjudication of its validity.

It is extremely doubtful whether the power of review and the right to suspend by injunction do not inhere constitutionally in the United States Courts, and whether it is possible to limit them by legislation. From our own point of view, the prolonged and animated contest over this point is but sound and fury, signifying nothing. Suppose the utmost demand of the so-called reformers should be granted, or suppose, in other words, that the Hepburn-Tillman bill should make an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission instantly and permanently opera-

tive, all judicial review and suspension by injunction being prohibited; what would it amount to? On the very first occasion when the Interstate Commerce Commission should issue a peremptory rate-making order, the railway affected would go before a United States Court and invoke the fundamental constitutional right of an American citizen, the right set forth in the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or *property* without due process of law. What is "due process of law"? The process of law which existed at the date when the first ten Amendments of the Constitution were adopted. The due process of law then included, and consequently must now include, the right of every citizen to have the validity of a Federal statute judicially tested, and, pending final adjudication, to have its operation suspended by injunction.

What is to be done about the Panama Canal? Not even the type of the canal has yet been definitely determined on, although by April 1st, tens of millions of dollars will have been expended on the Isthmus. Mr. Roosevelt's management of the canal problem is rapidly becoming an object of public derision. The specific responsibility for the conduct of the affair, which rests on Secretary Taft, has disqualified him for becoming the next Republican nominee for the Presidency. If Secretary Root is wise, he will resign sooner than acquiesce in the transfer of the Canal Strip and the construction of the interoceanic waterway to the State Department. If we may judge of the future by the past, disgust and ridicule will be the portion of any official who is called upon to handle that unlucky business. We never ought to have bought the canal franchise until after we had made up our mind as to what kind of a canal we wanted. Then, within thirty days after the purchase of the franchise, the work of excavation should have been begun in pursuance of the pre-determined plan. The work of sanitation could have gone on simultaneously, as it did at Suez, and as it did at Panama under the French *régime*. One thing is certain, and that is that the Senate will not give President Roosevelt, his Secretary of War, and his subordinate appointees the free hand in dealing with tens of millions of dollars which they have had during the last three years. They should not have an additional penny until it is known whether a lock canal or a sea-level canal is to be built; and, after funds are again entrusted to them for the work



of excavation, they should be compelled to make good by frequent and rigorous investigation. The carnival of wastefulness which, for some years, has been witnessed on the Isthmus should be summarily stopped.

It will be remembered that, three years ago, President Roosevelt, although he could find absolutely *no* authorization for the act in the Federal Constitution, intervened in the anthracite-coal strike, appointed a Commission and prevailed upon the mine-owners and the miners to agree to accept that Commission's award. The letters recently addressed by him to a conspicuous operator in the bituminous coal region, on the one hand, and to Mr. John Mitchell, the representative of the United Mine Workers, on the other, are viewed in Washington as an indication that Mr. Roosevelt intends to repeat his former unprecedented experiment. So far as the threatened strike in the bituminous coal-fields is concerned, it unquestionably should be averted. If the strike should be universal, it would put out of business all the railways in the United States that use the bituminous combustible, and would close every factory and foundry. To name but a single example of the damage it would cause, it would paralyze the colossal iron and steel industry, which, at present, is enjoying unparalleled prosperity. The arrest of that prosperity, and the prevention of railways from performing the work of transportation, would be not only economical catastrophes; they would be public crimes. Inasmuch, therefore, as Congress deliberately declined to dispute the constitutionality of the President's intervention, when it appropriated money to pay the members of the Anthracite Coal Commission, we are no doubt justified in believing that the Federal legislature, as well as public opinion, would sanction Mr. Roosevelt's interposition, so far as the bituminous mines would be affected by a strike. The case is otherwise with the anthracite mines. Here there is no pretence that the community would suffer from a strike. The reserve stocks of the anthracite companies are ample to carry consumers through the summer without any material increase in price. Under these circumstances, if the anthracite miners are not content with the extremely liberal award made by the Anthracite-Coal Strike Commission three years ago, they will deserve no pity for the consequences of their discontent, and should be allowed to bear the consequences of a concerted refusal to work.